BABY M: NEW BEGINNINGS AND
ANCIENT MILEPOSTS
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Were the great Greek dramatists today among us, they might
have found in the contemporary labors of the New Jersey
Supreme Court some dramatic material for their prizewinning
Athenian tragedies. These early tragic poets, like Shakespeare,
often drew upon history as the subject and theme of their dramatic action. Concerned with the Fates' reign over life and
death, the Alpha and Omega of human existence, they might2
have elevated the plights of Karen Ann Quinlan' and "Baby M"to lyric dimension.
The tale of a father, whose ancestors were all evilly destroyed, and a mother who, for compassion and fortune, bartered
for, bought and sold a baby crudely wrought by the mystery of
medicine to revitalize the father's line, would not appear foreign
to their wise imaginings; nor would the aristotelian quest forjustice and the chorus of comment which ensued when their best
laid plans were unravelled by the ancient longings of a mother's
heart.
Yet it is upon the present, not past, juridical stage that William Stern, Mary Beth Whitehead and their progeny, Baby M,
play their compelling parts before a society wanting of an old and
new wisdom.
In the winter of 1985, William Stern and Mary Beth
Whitehead and her husband, Richard Whitehead, sought to enSA.B., University of Notre )anme, 1967: M.A., University of Dayton, 1969; J.D.,
Universitx of Notre Dame, 1972: Ll.I..M., New York University, 1978: Vice Chairman
of the New Jersey Bioethics Commission, repr esented the Iamilies of Karen Ann
Quinlan and Nancy Ellen jobes before the courts of the state of New Jersey.
* * B.D., B.A., M.A. (Cantab.). A fieelancejournalist, Mr. Hill is l)irector of Public Information for the Citizens' Committee on Biomedical Ethics, Summit, New
Jersey.
The aulhors have written extensively on bioethical issues and wish to point
out
that the views expressed in this article are theirs and do not represent those of the
Citizens' Committee on Biomedical Ethics or the New Jersey Bioethics
Commission.
I See i re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cerl. deiled, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
2 Se, li re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
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gender a family for William and Elizabeth Stern by penning a socalled surrogate parenting agreement, commercially prepared by
the Infertility Center of New York (for $7,500), providing a
$10,000 fee for the artificial insemination of Mrs. Whitehead with
Mr. Stern's sperm, the bearing of the resulting child and its delivery to the Sterns who, after the necessary termination of Mrs.
Whitehead's maternal rights, would effect the baby's adoption by
the infertile Mrs. Stern.
Harmony and nature brought forth a healthy girl child in the
spring of 1986. Discord and human frailties unhappily led to a
bitter trial over her fate during 1986 and 1987, and a signal opinion of the New Jersey Supreme Court on the eve of her second
birthday in 1988.
Unable to conform her maternal instinct to contractual
agreement, Mrs. Whitehead, after initially surrendering the child
to Mr. and Mrs. Stern, begged and obtained her solicitous temporary return, and embarked upon a sad Florida odyssey culminating in an ex parte New Jersey pendente lite award of custody
to the Sterns which was ultimately and harrowingly enforced by
Florida authorities. The infant's custody was reaffirmed by the
trial court, pending its final judgment, and Mrs. Whitehead was
awarded limited visitation with Baby M.
In turning to an American courtroom, Mr. and Mrs. Stern
sought to enforce the provisions of the surrogacy contract that
would: 1) permanently place the child in their custody; 2) terminate Mrs. Whitehead's parental rights; and 3) allow the adoption
of the child by Mrs. Stern. After an extraordinary thirty-two day
trial, in which the media chorus played a subtle yet important
role (sometimes, unhappily, at the expense of those before the
court) in bringing this dilemma to the American public and fostering a forthright and keen debate which led to the necessary
public policy consensus upon which decision-makers eventually
act, the trial court upheld the contract's validity and, in accord
with its terms, immediately allowed the adoption of the baby,
now called Melissa, by Mrs. Stern!
In reaching his conclusions, the trial judge first found that
statutes concerning adoption, termination of parental rights, and
payment of money in connection with adoptions were uncontemplated by the legislature with regard to surrogate contracts and
thus simply did not apply to them. In the absence of specific stat'1 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (Ch. )iv. 1987), affd in part and rev'd in
part, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
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utory guidance, the court then concluded that surrogacy contracts are valid and the specific performance of their terms will be
granted only when it is demonstrated to be in the best interests
of the child before the court. This equitable calculus-the child's
best interests determine contractual validity-became the fundamental basis for the lower court opinion permanently placing
Baby M in the home of Mr. and Mrs. Stern.4
Differing in mind and heart over the premises and answer of
this formula, Mrs. Whitehead appealed and the New Jersey
Supreme Court, concerned for all, granted direct certification of
the cause. ChiefJustice Wilentz, writing for an unanimous court,
found the surrogate contract to be in conflict with the law and
public policy of the State of New Jersey and therefore illegal and
invalid. Concluding that the payment of money to "surrogate"
women is illegal, perhaps criminal, the seven-member tribunal
voided both the termination of Mrs. Whitehead's parental rights
and the adoption of the child by Mrs. Stern.' This said and done,
the court then granted custody, in the "best interests" of the infant, to Mr. Stern and remanded the issue of visitation by her
mother for an abbreviated hearing and determination before a
different trial judge," who subsequently found that these same
"interests" will be served by unsupervised, uninterrupted, liberal
visitation of mother and child.
In an essay adapted from his recent Chief Justice Joseph
Weintraub lecture, Associate Justice Alan B. Handler of the New
Jersey Supreme Court reminds us: "Some cases are better resolved by a process or procedure that encourages an ongoing dialogue rather than by an inflexible decision that purports to fix
individual rights and duties but simply will not stay in place because of the intractable complexity of the underlying problems." 7
It is in this spirit that we are privileged to join many distinguished commentators in the Seton Hall Law Review in the important process and promise of Justice Handler's dialogue.
Empirical evidence shows that possibly one in every seven
couples is infertile. There is also evidence to suggest that the
pain of infertility is unbearable and if endured for a prolonged
period will be the occasion of marital breakdown. This suggests
4 See Baby MA,217 N.J. Super. at 390-401, 525 A.2d at 1166-72.
5 See Baby AM,109 N.J. at 421-22, 537 A.2d at 1240.

G Id. at 463, 537 A.2d at 1261.
7 See Handler, Social Dilemmas, Judicial (h)resolutions, 40
(1987).
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that while infertility has bitter personal implications, it also has
serious implications for society as a whole and for the institution
of marriage in particular. It should come as no surprise then that
surrogate motherhood, technically one of the less difficult alternatives to natural childbirth available today, is viewed as one
more means to deal successfully with the problem of infertility.
Some would say that it is one more way to give the gift of life, and
add that since we have developed the medical technology, the
only thing that remains to be done is regulate to the use of surrogacy. The fact that it is possible and does remedy a deficiency
constitutes for these people the argument that it ought to be
available.
Stated in this fashion, the argument presents an almost irresistible temptation to take it up at the level of meta-ethics so as to
dispose of its central weakness which is to derive a value from a
fact, an "ought" from an "is." However, given the urgency of the
issue itself, and the degree of legislative activity and public policy
debate devoted to surrogacy, it is probably more practical, at
least in the short-term, to look at this argument from a somewhat
less elevated level.
In a distinguished article, Richard A. McCormick made the
telling observation that "when sterility gets absolutized as a disvalue in our thought patterns, strange things can happen."' It is
unlikely that the justices of the New Jersey Supreme Court were
considering this observation when they drew up their landmark
decision in In re Baby M. But a careful reading of their decision
suggests that they might as well have been doing so. Of course at
one level, the court's decision addresses the specific details of the
case that is now known as Baby M. But at another level, the same
decision assumes a much larger task beyond the confines of the
dispute between Mary Beth Whitehead and William Stern and
central to the concerns of public policy appropriate to a society
such as ours. In that sense the details and the texture of the
court's decision can be understood as a guide by which the general public may tease out the legacy of Baby M in particular and
the implications of surrogacy in general. If the broad implications are as troublesome as the specific legacy, something unambiguously stated in the court's analysis, then there is every reason
for us to pause and rethink this entire matter before proceeding
any further. Whether intentional or not, the line of argumenta8 McCormick, Therapy or Tamperng-? The Ethics of Reproductive Technology, AM.,

Dec. 7, 1985, at 402.
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tion adopted by the supreme court makes it possible for us to
consider in concrete terms what happens when infertility is understood as an absolute disvalue, and forces us to ask to what
lengths does such a disvalue justify us in going to negate it?
Does it, for example, warrant what the court described as the coercion of contract by which the natural mother agrees irrevocably
to surrender her child prior, not only to birth, but even to conception? Further, does it warrant the natural mother's agreement that she will not contest any proceedings undertaken to end
her rights as a parent? Finally, does it warrant an a priori concession, again on the part of the natural mother, that the primary
interests of the child would best be served by awarding custody
to the natural father and his wife?
The answer to all three questions is yes based on a presumption that has, up to now in the discussion of surrogacy, lived a
charmed life so as to escape any rigorous criticism. The presumption is that values and disvalues exist in self-containing isolation and justify the selection of a particular means solely by
virtue of its effectiveness in realizing the value or negating the
disvalue. Some will argue that at the bottom of this is the old
argument of the end justifying the means. In fact, it represents a
growing tendency to measure everything so egocentrically that
the individual is the center of a universe that has no boundaries
beyond his reach. In that sense it represents the perversion of
Robert Browning's injunction that "a man's grasp should exceed
his reach, or what's a heaven for?"'"
It was not the intention of, nor would it have been appropriate for, the New Jersey Supreme Court to comment on the implications of the Baby M case from this philosophical perspective.
What is so compelling about the texture of the court's analysis,
however, is the way it lends itself to a philosophic discussion.
The centerpiece to this is the ringing declaration that "[t]here
are, in a civilized society, some things that money cannot buy."'
In part, this is a rejection of pragmatism which welcomes something because it works. More important to the purpose of subjecting surrogacy and its implications to an exacting criticism, is
the court's rejection, again by implication, of ethical egoism.''
9' See R. BROWNING, ANDREA DEL SARTO 1855 (Ist ed. 1855).
10 Baby il, 109 N.J. at 440, 537 A.2d at 1249.
I I See W.K. FRANKENA, ETrics 16 (1963) Ethical egoism is described as a normative theory
which represents one rather extreme kind of reaction to the ethics of
traditional rules. This is the ethics of what Butler calls self-love and of
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Ethical egoism measures human behavior and judgment
strictly by the advantages they bring to individuals as they pursue
good and avoid evil. To be an ethical principle, it has to be applicable universally, allowing everyone to pursue his or her own
perceived good without interfering with the pursuit of others.
History shows that this has never been possible for the human
community and prompts the conclusion, based on the inherent
logic of the question, that ethical egoism is untenable as an ethical theory.
The significant thing here is that the New Jersey Supreme
Court, whether wittingly or not is beside the point, has judged
surrogacy to be a thorough-going example of ethical egoism, and
rejected it for the irreconcilable conflicts of rights it unavoidably
provokes.
For example, the court found that "[t~he whole purpose and
effect of the surrogacy contract was to give the father exclusive
right to the child by destroying the rights of the mother."'"
Some will respond by saying that the whole point of the contract,
assuming informed consent in this case on the part of the woman, is the voluntary surrender of the exercise of those rights.
But this is too superficial a response for what the court is suggesting. Apart from the fact that it considers the possibility of
informed consent most unlikely under the circumstances, the
court is also implicitly asking whether consent to necessity is really consent or whether it is acquiescence. That is, the inherent
logic of surrogacy presumes the fiction that the woman who bears
the child, whatever else she might be, is not a mother to that
child. Lest reality intrude, a contract is used to deny the moral
bond between a woman and the child who has come to term in
her womb. The court implies that to deny the moral bond is to
deny the biological connection. And that is impossible. In other
what Freudians call the ego; but it should be noted that an ethical egoist
need not be an egotist or even an egoistic or selfish man in the everyday
senses of these terms. Ethical egoism is an ethical theory, not a pattern of
action or trait of character, and is compatible with being self-effacing
and unselfish in practice. Even if an ethical egoist is consistent with his
theory in the conduct of his life, he may still not do the things that we
ordinarily call egotistic, egoistic, narcissistic, or selfish. Whether he
does these things will depend on whether he thinks they are to his advantage in the long run, and he need not think this; in fact, he may think
that modesty and consideration for others are, like honesty, "the best
policy" for him to go by. He may, in other words, be quite an "enlightened" egoist.
Id.
12

Baby .11, 109 N.J. at 436, 537 A.2d at 1247.
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words, surrogacy is a form of ethical egoism, and as such entails
an irreconcilable conflict of interests.
This emerges more clearly in the court's discussion of the
right to procreate: "To assert that Mr. Stern's right of procreation gives him the right to the custody of Baby M would be to
assert that Mrs. Whitehead's right to procreation does not give
her the right to the custody of Baby M ..... ': The court concludes that such an assertion means that the constitutional right
of procreation includes within it a constitutionally protected contractual right to destroy someone else's right of procreation. It is
not too difficult to see where that conclusion logically leads. Surrogate motherhood is a contradiction in terms. One person,
party to the surrogate arrangement, can only exercise his rights
on condition that he deny the rights of the other party involved.
That is the nature of surrogacy and underscores the perverse
irony to be found in the phrase, "surrogate motherhood." If
there is one thing surrogacy cannot stand for here, it is motherhood. This in its final analysis is what the court means by "coercion of contract."
A civilized society will indeed be moved by the plight of the
infertile. But the decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court
alerts us to the probability that by absolutizing the disvalue of
their lot, we may in the end fail them as extremely, while compounding the very problem we sought to resolve in the first
place.
The Greeks and Shakespeare well knew human conflicts and
the larger laws which shape our ends. It is plain that the decision
of the New Jersey Supreme Court, fashioning extant law to the
particular plight of "Baby M," remains of a general piece with
these ever present principles. In an era now marked by the prospect of participation in our own human evolution through genetic engineering and plagued by the tragedy of AIDS, it is
inspiriting to note that this tribunal has reaffirmed the lessons
which have long served to guide the human community.
31

Id. at 448, 537 A.2d at 1254.

